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5Fundamental rights and the interface between
second and third pillar
eleanor spaventa
It is necessary for him who lays out a state and arranges laws for it to
presuppose that all men are evil and that they are always going to act
according to the wickedness of their spirits whenever they have free
scope.1
5.1 Introduction
Following the terrorist attacks perpetrated first against the United States
and later against Spain and the United Kingdom, action at international
level to combat terrorism has grown steadily. Such action has been taken
at both United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) level in forms
previously unknown in the field of international cooperation. In par-
ticular, both the UN and the EU have taken upon themselves the task of
identifying organisations and individuals that are to be considered as
terrorists by international and national communities alike. This process of
identification of who or what should be considered a ‘terrorist’ occurs
entirely in executive fora, thus challenging presumptions which have
characterised post-war Western democracies as to the division of com-
petences between executive, legislature and judiciary, as well as deeply
affecting established systems of checks and balances. Furthermore, such
evolution in intergovernmental action has not been matched by a corres-
ponding evolution in the system of judicial protection. Thus, whilst inter-
national cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism activity might well be
vital to ensure an effective response to the terrorist threat, international
organisations are ill equipped, as things stand, to guarantee even the more
I am grateful to Michael Dougan for comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 N. Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, translated by A. Gilbert (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 1965).
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basic rights of individuals and organisations that are targeted through
international instruments. The complexity of the interaction between
international, European and national law makes it equally difficult for
national (and European) judiciaries to intervene in such cases. Those
might entail gathering of sensitive evidence possibly relating to another
State; problems stemming from hierarchy of norms; inevitable political
pressures of compromising the executive’s action and its standing in
international relations.
In the EU context, the tension between intergovernmental cooperation
and effective judicial protection has become manifest following the
adoption of a series of counter-terrorism measures, and in particular
following the adoption of an EU list of terrorists using a mixed second and
third pillar legal basis; and following the adoption of a Community
Regulation to freeze the assets of some of the individuals and entities listed
in the relevant Common Position. In this sense, the interface between
second and third pillar, the instrumental use of Treaty competences to
exclude or limit both judicial and democratic accountability, has brought
a considerable reduction of fundamental rights standards in the EU. This
contribution explores such developments from a fundamental rights
perspective. It focuses solely on action taken by the EU on its own
account, since action taken by the EU as a result of UN action is exten-
sively explored elsewhere in this book.2 The overall claim of this contri-
bution is that, given the lack of judicial protection available at EU level,
the main responsibility for ensuring effective review in those cases rests
with the national courts which have, as a matter of EU law, a duty to
ensure that fundamental rights are adequately protected.
5.2 The EU terrorist lists: machiavellian use of competence
or genuine counter-terrorist response?
The EU counter-terrorism response resulted in the adoption of a
wide-ranging set of measures, spanning from the Framework Decision on
Combating Terrorism,3 to that on the European Arrest Warrant,4 from
2 See contribution by Piet Eeckhout in this volume.
3 Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002/475/JHA), OJ 2002 L 164/3.
4 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender
procedure between Member States, OJ 2002 L 190/1.
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the agreement with the United States on extradition,5 to that on Passenger
Name Records.6 Amongst those measures, the EU has also adopted two
Common Positions, which identified certain organisations and individ-
uals as being involved in ‘terrorist’ acts. The two Common Positions
should be distinguished since their status in Community law is different.
Common Position 2002/4027 has been adopted to give effect to UN
Resolution 1390(2002), the so called Anti-Taliban Resolution.8 According
to the latter, the UN Sanctions Committee draws up a list of those indi-
viduals and organisations who are alleged to be linked to the Taliban,
Al-Qaeda and the like. National authorities must then take action to
freeze the assets of those listed in the UN list. In order to give effect to the
UN Anti-Taliban Resolution, the EU has adopted the above-mentioned
Common Position, and a Community Regulation requiring the freezing
of assets of those entities/individuals identified by the UN Sanctions
Committee. We are not concerned with this Common Position, since, as
said above, this is examined elsewhere in the book.
The other instrument which contains a list of alleged terrorists
(including organisations) is Common Position 2001/931.9 This instrument
is broadly speaking aimed at implementing UN Security Council
5 Agreement on extradition between the European Union and the United States of America,
OJ 2003 L 181/27; see generally J. Wouters and F. Naert, ‘Of Arrest Warrants, Terrorist
Offences and Extradition Deals: an Appraisal of the EU’s Main Criminal Law Measures against
Terrorism after 11 September’, 41 CMLRev. (2004), p. 909.
6 Agreement on extradition between the European Union and the United States of America,
OJ 2003 L 181/27; see also Agreement on mutual legal assistance between the European Union
and the United States of America, OJ 2003 L 181/34; Agreement between the European Union
and the United States of America on the processing and transferring of passenger name record
(PNR) data by air carriers to the United States, OJ 2006 L 298/29. For a rather critical appraisal
of the agreement, see the debate in front of the plenary session of the European Parliament,
Use of Passenger Data, debate of 11 October 2006, Document of 16/10/06, 13991/06 PE 326.
The first PNR agreement had been adopted using Community competence and was annulled
for lack of competence, Joined Cases C-317 and 318/04 European Parliament v. Council and
Commission (2006) ECR I-4721. For this reason, the Council had to re-adopt the agreement
relying on third pillar competence (Art. 38 TEU read in conjunction with 24(4) TEU). As a
result, the agreement cannot be challenged in front of the ECJ, since the latter has no juris-
diction in relation to such matters.
7 Common Position 2002/402/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Osama bin Laden,
members of the Al-Qaeda organisation and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings
and entities associated with them and repealing Common Positions 96/746/CFSP, 1999/727/CFSP,
2001/154/CFSP and 2001/771/CFSP, OJ 2002 L 169/4.
8 UN Security Council Resolution 1390(2002).
9 Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism,
OJ 2001 L 344/93.
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Resolution 1371(2001),10 the general anti-terrorist Resolution, which
provides that States must fight terrorism by adopting a series of measures,
including the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts,
the criminalisation of the financing of terrorist acts and the freezing of
assets of those in any way connected with a terrorist activity. The general
anti-terrorism Resolution, however, fails to define what is to be under-
stood as a ‘terrorist act’ since agreement could not be reached on that
point. Furthermore, in relation to this measure, there is no prior identi-
fication at UN level of those individuals and entities which should be
subjected to restrictive measures.
Common Position 2001/931 has been adopted using a mixed second
and third pillar competence, since it relates to two different types of
terrorist organisations/individuals: one part of the list relates to those
alleged terrorists who have a link with a third country, i.e. whose alleged
activity is external to the EU borders; the other part of the list is concerned
with alleged terrorists whose activity is wholly internal to the EU. The
distinction between ‘foreign linked’ and ‘home’ terrorists is important
because for the former, the Council was able to use Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) competence (Art. 15 TEU) and therefore rely on
the passarelle clause contained in the EC Treaty (Arts. 301 and 60 EC,
complemented by Art. 308) in order to trigger the Community compe-
tence to adopt a Regulation to freeze the assets of those identified in the
list.11 Like in the case of the UN-derived Regulation, residual competence
of the Community was necessary to adopt the Regulation, since the
freezing order does not specifically concern ‘third countries’.
In relation to home terrorists, the Council had to rely on Article 34
TEU, thus adopting the act using police and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters competence. Since in this case there was no ‘foreign’
element involved, the Council considered that there was no possibility of
justifying action at CFSP level. Given that this part of the list was adopted
using third pillar competence, the Community could not enact a freezing
Regulation as there is no passarelle clause bridging the first and third
pillars. As a result, there is no direct ‘legal consequence’ arising from
being included in the EU domestic list: there is no freezing of assets at
10 UN Resolution 1373(2001), 28 September 2001.
11 Council Regulation 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons
and entities with a view to combating terrorism, OJ 2001 L 344/70.
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Community level, and the only obligation imposed upon Member States
by the Common Position is that of affording ‘each other the widest
possible assistance in preventing and combating terrorist acts’ and to ‘fully
exploit’ their existing powers in relation to enquiries and proceedings
conducted in relation to any of the organisations or individuals listed
in the Annex to the Common Position.12 Common Position 2001/931
appears then to be, for home-related terrorists, little more than a naming
and shaming instrument. Such naming and shaming is obviously not
without consequences for those therein mentioned; however, even if such
consequences might be very serious, there is no possibility in relation to
this list to bring review proceedings in front of the European courts.
Title VI of the EU Treaty does not provide for the possibility to bring
direct proceedings for annulment of third pillar instruments. Thus,
individuals listed in the Common Position cannot challenge either the
legality of the Common Position, or their inclusion in the list. Further-
more, third pillar Common Positions are excluded from the limited
preliminary ruling jurisdiction of the Court.13
Common Position 2001/931 and Regulation 2580/2001 therefore raise
considerable problems since the EU’s system of judicial protection seems,
when available at all, inadequate to the task of protecting individuals from
executive action. We will first consider the problems raised by Regulation
2580/2001, then turn to the problems faced by those whose name has been
included in the home-terrorist list.
5.3 Expanding Community competence beyond Community
objectives: the adoption of Regulation 2580/2001
Individuals and organisations whose alleged terrorist activity takes place
outside the territory of the EU are identified by the Council in a list
annexed to Common Position 2001/931. Such list is drawn up ‘on the
basis of precise information or material in the relevant file which indicates
that a decision has been taken by a competent authority’. The competent
authority is a ‘judicial authority’ or, where judicial authorities have no
competence, ‘an equivalent competent authority in that area’.14 The
decision might concern the instigation of investigations, prosecutions or
12 Article 4 Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. 13 Article 35 TEU.
14 Article 1(4) Common Position 2001/931.
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condemnation for terrorist acts. Article 1(6) provides that such list must
be reviewed at regular intervals, and at least once every six months, to
ensure that there are grounds for keeping individuals and entities on the
list. According to Article 2 Common Position 2001/931, the European
Community must order the freezing of the funds of those identified in
the list. This has been done by means of Regulation 2580/2001 which
provides for the freezing of assets of those identified in a list drawn up by
the Council acting in unanimity in accordance with the provisions of
Common Position 2001/931. De facto the list drawn in the Common
Position is then replicated, for those who have a foreign link, in a Com-
munity instrument for the purpose of freezing assets. The first problem
that arises in relation to Regulation 2580/2001 relates to whether the
Community had competence to enact such measure.
As mentioned above, Regulation 2580/2001 was adopted using two
legal bases: Article 60 read in conjunction with Article 301 EC, which
provide the bridge between CFSP and the Community; and Article 308
EC, which provides for the residual competence of the Community. The
reason for the dual legal basis is that Article 60 EC refers to measures on
the movement of capital and payments as regards ‘third countries con-
cerned’. Thus, in relation to those individuals and entities that do not have
a specific connection with a third country, there was no other competence
in the EC Treaty than the Community residual competence. In the Yusuf
and Kadi cases,15 the Court of First Instance (CFI) found that in relation
to the UN-derived lists, the Community had competence to adopt a Regu-
lation which provides for the freezing of assets of listed entities and indi-
viduals, even when such entities and individuals did not have a connection
with third countries.
In the CFI’s opinion, such competence could not rest on Articles 301
and 60 EC alone, since those provisions require the measure to be adopted
in relation to third countries. Whilst such a link with third countries is
present in relation to so-called smart sanctions, i.e. sanctions that target
specific individuals which have dealings with, or economic activities
directed at, the third country which is being sanctioned, such is not the
15 Case T-306/01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission (2005) ECR II-3533; Case
T-315/01 Kadi v. Council and Commission (2005) ECR II-3649; the two rulings are virtually
identical for what we are concerned and, therefore, thereafter we will refer solely to the Yusuf
ruling.
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case when the individual or organisation targeted cannot be clearly linked
with a third country. That was the case in relation to the Anti-Taliban
Regulation since, following the regime change, the Taliban did not have a
specific connection with the Afghan Government. The CFI also found
that Article 308 EC, which provides for the residual competence of the
Community, could not be relied upon, by itself, as a legal basis for the
Regulation freezing the assets of those identified in the list. In order to rely
on Article 308 EC, it is necessary to link the action taken to one of the
objectives of the Community; however, the CFI found that neither the
CCP, nor the free movement of capital or the risk of a distortion of
competition, could be relied upon to establish such a link. Further, the
CFI held that Article 308 EC cannot be of help in ‘giving the institutions
general authority to use that provision as a basis with a view to attaining
one of the objectives of the Treaty on European Union’.16 Otherwise, the
CFI reasoned, the specificity of the pillars would be compromised and the
Community would gain competence in all matters covered by the second
and third pillar.
However, the CFI then found that a cumulative reading of Articles 308,
301 and 60 EC, was capable of establishing Community competence to
adopt a Regulation freezing the funds of individuals who had no con-
nection with a ‘third country’. In order to make such finding, the CFI
reasoned as follows. Articles 60 and 301 EC are ‘quite special provisions’:
they establish the passarelle between the CFSP and the Community, and
when action is taken under those provisions, the action is in fact that of
the Union not that of the Community. The CFI then remarked how,
according to Article 3 TEU, the Union is to be served by a single insti-
tutional framework, and how it has to ensure consistency of its external
activities as a whole. It then continued: ‘Now, just as the powers provided
for by the EC Treaty may be proved to be insufficient to allow the insti-
tutions to act in order to attain, in the operation of the common market,
one of the objectives of the Community, so the powers to impose eco-
nomic and financial sanctions provided for by Articles 60 EC and 301 EC,
namely, the interruption or reduction of economic relations with one or
more third countries, especially in respect of movements of capital and
payments, may be proved insufficient to allow the institutions to attain
the objective of the CFSP, under the Treaty on European Union, in view of
16 Case T-306/01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission (2005) ECR II-3533, para. 136.
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which those provisions were specifically introduced into the EC Treaty.’17
For this reason, the Community had competence to enact the contested
Regulation.
The CFI’s purposive reasoning is very interesting: the creation of the
bridge between two pillars, which are otherwise linked only by the com-
mon provisions of the TEU, allows for a greater flow than appears at first
sight. Thus, Article 308 EC can be used to attain the objectives set out in
Articles 301 and 60 EC. Pragmatically, one might well agree with the CFI
and note that when those provisions were drafted the world was a very
different place. It is not surprising, then, that the drafters did not provide
for the possibility to enact sanctions against individuals and entities acting
on their own accord, since the situation warranting those types of sanc-
tions had not yet presented itself. However, the principle of attributed
powers is not only a fundamental constitutional principle of the Treaty, it
is also a guarantee for national parliaments, and for the democratic
process as a whole. This was made clear in Opinion 2/94 where the ECJ
held that Article 308 EC ‘cannot serve as a basis for widening the scope of
Community powers beyond the general framework created by the pro-
visions of the Treaty as a whole and, in particular, by those that define the
tasks and the activities of the Community’.18 By allowing the use of that
provision to widen the bridge between the two pillars for the attainment of
CFSP objectives, rather that for the attainment of Community objectives
‘in the course of the operation of the common market’, the CFI, however,
did exactly that: it broadened the scope of Community competence.
In such delicate matters, where individual rights are at stake, this result
might be seen as not entirely satisfactory, not the least since it prevented a
national debate as to whether such type of sanctions should be enacted
by the Community and whether, if so, special guarantees should not
accompany Community action. In this respect, the CFI failed to notice
that the expansion of Community competence in this case would entail
a ‘modification of the system for the protection of fundamental rights’,
since it affects the guarantees of effective judicial protection provided for
in domestic systems;19 that it clearly had ‘fundamental institutional
17 Case T-306/01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission (2005) ECR II-3533, para. 163.
18 Opinion 2/94 Accession of the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1996) ECR I-1579, para. 30.
19 Ibid., para. 35.
136 eleanor spaventa
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 129.234.252.66 on Fri Mar 30 14:19:41 BST 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511494925.006
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
implications’ for the Member States,20 since it affected the right and duty
of national parliaments to scrutinise executive action in a field which
affects individual rights, and that therefore it went beyond the scope of
Article 308 EC.
For the time being, however, the issue of competence should be treated
as a fait accompli also in relation to Regulation 2580/2001, since the fact
that the Regulation at issue in Yusuf was implementing (indirectly)
a Security Council Resolution played no part in the CFI’s assessment of
the Community competence to act.
It is now time to turn our attention to more substantive issues in
relation to the listing process and to the judicial remedies available to
those who are included in the list. We will first consider the list as attached
to Regulation 2580/2001, then turn to the list annexed to Common
Position 2001/931. Whilst, as we have seen above, the list in the former
reproduces partially the list in the latter, the legal issues the two raise are
different since in relation to the latter there is no jurisdiction of the
European courts.
5.4 The right to effective judicial protection and
the foreign terrorist list
As mentioned above, the Community judicature has full jurisdiction,
both in direct actions and in preliminary rulings, in relation to the list of
‘foreign’ terrorists attached to Regulation 2580/2001.21 Thus, there is as
much access to the judicature as it is possible in the Community system
and the individual is not deprived of judicial protection. The problem,
however, is whether such protection is truly effective and whether it is
substantive, as well as formal.
A recent ruling of the CFI might serve to illustrate the problem. In the
Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran (OMPI),22 the claimants
20 Ibid., para. 35.
21 Those listed in the annex to the Regulation are deemed to be directly and individually
concerned for the purposes of Article 230 EC, see, e.g. Case T-228/02 Organisation des
Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran, judgment of 12 December 2006. This said, the question of
standing might still be problematic in relation to organisations, see, e.g. T-299/02 PKK and
KNK v. Council (2005) ECR II-539, overruled by C-229/05P PKK and KNK v. Council,
judgment of 18 January 2007, nyr.
22 Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran, judgment of 12 December 2006.
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brought proceedings against the Council challenging the legality of their
inclusion in the list annexed to Common Position 2001/931, as well as
their inclusion in the list annexed to Regulation 2580/2001, which had the
effect of freezing their assets. It appears from the case that the decision to
include the applicants in such lists was instigated by the United Kingdom,
which also included them in its own terrorist list. In challenging their
inclusion in the lists, the claimants relied on several pleas, amongst which
the most relevant for our analysis are infringement of the right to a fair
hearing; infringement of essential procedural requirements; infringement
of the right to effective judicial protection; infringement of the presumption
of innocence; and a manifest error of assessment.
The process of ‘listing’ is surrounded by a certain secrecy. According to
Common Position 2001/931, the list is drawn on the basis of ‘precise
information or material in the relevant file which indicated that a decision
has been taken by a competent authority’ in respect of those concerned.
And, a ‘competent authority’ means a judicial authority or, when such
authority does not have competence, an ‘equivalent’ competent authority.
De facto it appears that persons and organisations are placed on the EU
and EC lists at the request of one of the Member States, and that the
Council exercises only a formal power of scrutiny.23 Those who are to be
included on the list have no right to submit observations either before or
after having been placed on the list; and might well not be aware of the
reason that led to their inclusion, or of the authority (and the Member
State) that instigated the listing.24 Indeed, since inclusion is at the request
of the Member States, the Council itself might not be in a position to
23 On this point, see E. Spaventa, ‘Fundamental what? The difficult relationship between foreign
policy and fundamental rights’, in M. Cremona and B. de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations
law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming); and also I. Tap-
peiner, ‘The fight against terrorism. The lists and the gaps’, Utrecht Law Review (2005), p. 97,
also available at: www.utrechtlawreview.org.
24 Following the CFI ruling in Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran,
judgment of 12 December 2006, nyr, the Council has indicated that it is going to ‘provide
a statement of reasons to each person and entity subject to the asset freeze, wherever that is
feasible, and to establish a clearer and more transparent procedure for allowing listed persons
and entities to request that their case be re-considered’, EU Council Secretariat Factsheet
‘Judgement of the Court of First Instance in the OMPI case T-228/02’. And in the Notice for
the attention of those persons/groups/entities that have been included by Council Decision
2006/1008/EC of 21 December on the list of persons, groups and entities to which Regulation
2580/2001 applies (OJ 2006 C 320/02), the Council expressly stated that it is open to those
listed to request a statement of reasons when the statement had not already been provided.
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declare the information requested, either because that information does
not appear in the file, or because disclosure might prejudice security
interests of the Member State concerned. Furthermore, in at least one
instance, the inclusion of an individual in the list appears to have been at
the request of a third country.25
In analysing the lawfulness of the OMPI’s inclusion in the list, the CFI,
most likely mindful of the political minefield in which it had landed,
limited its observations to issues of procedural propriety. The CFI started
by finding that both the right to a fair hearing, the obligation to state
reasons and the right to effective judicial protection all applied in the
context of the decision to freeze funds.
Acknowledging that the listing procedure initially takes place at the
national level, the CFI held that the right to be heard played first (and
foremost) in the context of the national procedure.26 However, it should
be noted, that such a right does not stem from Community law since, prior
to the adoption of the decision which leads to inclusion in the list, the matter
can be said to fall exclusively within national law. In contrast to the sub-
stantive obligations imposed upon Member States in relation to the
delisting process at UN level,27 it is unlikely that Community law might be
of use in increasing (or establishing) procedural guarantees at this stage of
the domestic procedure. However, once the person/organisation is or has
been included in the Community list, Community law imposes upon the
Council a duty to respect Community law rights, including those rights
deriving from the general principles. In defining the extent of such rights,
the CFI substantially accepted the argument put forward by the United
Kingdom to the effect that it is not for the Council to decide whether
the proceedings conducted at national level are well-founded and whether
the claimant’s fundamental rights were respected in that context. Thus, the
25 See, e.g. the transcript of comments on combating the financing of terrorism made by Alan P.
Larson, Under Secretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, in testimony before
the House (Congress) Committee on Financial Services on 19 September 2002, available at:
http://useu.usmission.gov/Dossiers/Terrorist_Financing/Sep1902_Larson_Testimony.asp; ‘The
European Union has worked with us to ensure that nearly every terrorist individual and entity
designated by the United States has also been designated by the European Union’, and also the
testimony of Juan C. Zarate (Deputy Assistant Secretary, Executive Office) Terrorist financing
and financial crime, US Department of the Treasury, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
18 March 2003, JS-139, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js139.htm.
26 Case T-228/02, para. 119.
27 Case T-253/02 Ayadi v. Council, judgment of 12 July 2006, nyr.
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claimant’s rights in relation to the inclusion in the EU list is limited to
a right to make their views known about the legality of such inclusion,
i.e. whether there is a decision of a competent authority and whether the
material in the file shows that such a decision was taken by a competent
authority, etc. Furthermore, the complainants also gain a right to be
notified of the evidence adduced against them (or such evidence as there is
in the file) before, or soon after, their inclusion, or their reinclusion in the
list. And, the Council has a duty to state the reasons which led it to include
the person in the list. Such rights can, however, be curtailed for overriding
reasons of public interest, and in particular for reasons relating to national
security. Further, the CFI also clarified that it must be put in a position to
actually review the lawfulness of the inclusion in the list: in the case at issue,
neither the United Kingdom nor the Council had provided it or the
claimant with sufficient information as to either the authority which had
taken the decision, or the reasons that led Council to include the applicant
in the list. Furthermore, the CFI also found that OMPI’s right to be heard
had been violated; for these reasons, the decision to include the OMPI in
the list was quashed.
The OMPI ruling is very complex, and it falls beyond the scope of this
contribution to provide a detailed analysis of it. However, a few remarks
are worth making. From a fundamental rights perspective, the CFI’s
approach is of course to be welcomed since it sets at least some procedural
limits to be respected by the executive when imposing economic sanctions
on individuals. And, it also makes clear that violation of such procedural
guarantees might lead to the annulment of the decision to include
a person/organisation in the list. However, it should be noted that the CFI
refused to engage in a substantive review of the reasons which led to
inclusion, and also indicated that such substantive review would never fall
among its tasks. In the CFI’s view, such substantive review is a matter for
the competent authority at national level. Furthermore, the CFI excluded
that Council has a duty to scrutinise the national authority’s decision to
include someone in the list.
The effect of this finding is to establish a system of quasi-automatic
recognition of decisions taken by authorities in the Member States, and
possibly also in third countries. Whilst admittedly such recognition is not
automatic, since a Council decision is still necessary, the CFI’s statement
to the effect that even the Council is not required to look at the substantive
reasons that led to the national decision is not very satisfactory, especially
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when one considers it together with the statement that Council should not
even look at whether the fundamental rights of the parties have been
respected at national level. This might of course lead to decisions taken in
breach of fundamental rights (and yet in conformity with national law) to
be given a pan-European effect, without any possibility of redress. And,
this would presumably be the case even when the decision had been taken
by an authority of a third country, even in instances in which the third
country’s standard of fundamental rights protection falls below that
guaranteed by the EU. In a field like terrorism, where the very definition
and decision as to what and who constitutes a terrorist might be politically
motivated, this is a regrettable state of affairs. This is even more the
case since such pervasive effects in national law were achieved without a
clear Parliamentary mandate and through an expansive interpretation
of Community competence.
In any case, and regardless of any misgivings one might have about
both the Community regime and the OMPI ruling, it should be queried
how effective the jurisdiction of the Community courts is. At the time of
writing, the ruling of the CFI had yet to be given effect: the OMPI was
still listed in the Annex to Regulation 2580/2001 and its assets were still
frozen.28 Furthermore, the Council has indicated that it did not consider
that the ruling applies to the list annexed to the Common Position since
the CFI did not annul the applicant’s inclusion in that list. Whilst it
is true that the CFI could not comment upon the legality of the inclusion
of the OMPI in the list annexed to the Common Position, since it has no
jurisdiction over such instruments, the obligation to respect fundamental
rights applies also to CFSP and third pillar instruments by virtue of
Article 6 TEU and of the general principles of EU law. The finding that the
applicants’ fundamental rights had been infringed applies a fortiori to the
list adopted in the context of the Common Position, and, if anything, it
applies even more strongly in that context because of the lack of juris-
diction of the Community courts. However, the Council made clear that it
has no intention of taking the OMPI off that list.29 In its press release the
Council also indicated that the freezing of funds did no longer apply to
OMPI. This notwithstanding, the Council has failed to amend the list
28 Cf. A. Rettman, ‘EU backing down on terror list secrecy’, EUobserver, 16 January 2007.
29 EU Council Secretariat Factsheet Judgment of the Court of First Instance in the OMPI Case
T-228/02, para. 3.
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annexed to the Regulation.30 This poses some not insignificant problems
for the authorities and banks which have to comply with the freezing
order: theoretically, once an act has been declared null by a competent
court, and lacking a statement of continued validity pending the adoption
of a new and valid act, that act is legally non-existent.31 Practically,
however, it is likely that those who have to execute the freezing order will
be unwilling to take the risk of releasing the assets without having received
clear instructions to that end. The only concession that the Council has
made to the CFI ruling was to issue a notice concomitant to the Decision
which added some people and entities to the list annexed to Regulation
2580/2001.32 In such notice, the Council alerted those included in the new
list to their right to request reasons, to their right to apply to Council for a
decision to reconsider, and to their right to bring Article 230 EC review
proceedings in front of the CFI.
Finally, there is an open question as to whether the EU terrorist
lists should be considered as still in force. As said above, Article 1(6) of
Common Position 2001/931, which applies also to Regulation 2580/2001,
provides that the names in the list should be reviewed at regular intervals
and at least once every six months ‘to ensure that there are grounds for
keeping them on the list’. There are two questions, closely interconnected,
in relation to this provision: first, does the review necessarily take the form
of a new decision, or can it be seen as simply a confirmatory act? And
second, what is the legal consequence of failure to carry out the review?
As for the first point, Council practice indicates that a new decision
must be taken, when the review is carried out, in relation to all entities
listed. Thus, the Council has so far updated the list by means of Common
Positions and decisions (for that annexed to the Regulation) which
30 Council Decision 2006/1008 of implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation 2580/2001 on specific
restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating
terrorism, OJ 2006 L 379/123.
31 Of course, the CFI ruling does not affect freezing of funds pursuant to national law, see,
e.g. Hansard 8 January 2007, reply by Mr McNulty to a question posed by Mr David Jones
‘The Court of First Instance did not rule on the substantive question as to whether People
Mojahedin Organisation of Iran is a terrorist group; its judgement was on EU procedures, and
as such has no effect on the UK’s domestic proscription arrangements.’
32 Notice for the attention of those persons/groups/entities that have been included by Council
Decision 2006/1008/EC of 21 December on the list of persons, groups and entities to which
Regulation 2580/2001 applies, OJ 2006 C 320/3.
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repealed the previous instruments.33 This practice is consistent with
a purposive interpretation of Article 1(6), since the review establishes
a guarantee for those listed and it cannot be interpreted as being a mere
formal requirement. Such interpretation seems also consistent with the
CFI ruling in the OMPI case, since the CFI has indicated that the decision
to keep someone on the list following the review is to be considered a new
decision so that those included have a right to be heard in relation to that
decision. Furthermore, if the duty to review implies the duty to adopt a
new decision in respect of all applicants, then it means that, in contrast
to the UN list, unanimity is required to place someone on the list, and
not to strike someone off.34
The second interpretative problem relates to the legal value of the lists
in the event in which six months elapse without Council having adopted
a new decision. This was the situation at the time of writing since the last
decisions in respect of the lists were taken in May 2006.35 Article 1(6)
does not appear to introduce an automatic sunset clause, i.e. it does
not state that the Common Position and decisions which contain the list
have a validity limited to six months. However, the wording of that
provision suggests that the review should be considered an essential
procedural requirement, non-compliance with which renders the deci-
sion open to legal challenge after the expiry of the six-month term. The
duty to review is in fact phrased in mandatory terms, so that there seems
to be no discretion vested in the Council as to when, and whether, to
engage in the review process. Furthermore, this interpretation is also in
line with the very purpose of the review which is aimed at ensuring that
33 Last updates, Council Common Position 2006/380/CFSP of 29 May 2006 updating Common
Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and
repealing Common Position 2006/231/CFSP, OJ 2006 L 144/25; and Council Decision 2006/
379 of 29 May 2006 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation 2580/2001 on specific restrictive
measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and
repealing Council Decision 2005/930, OJ 2006 L 379/123.
34 And this might well be the reason why Council has failed to review the May lists: thus it might be
that agreement could not be reached on whether to keep on the list some of those therein listed.
35 Council Decision 2006/379 of 29 May 2006 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation 2580/
2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view
to combating terrorism and repealing Council Decision 2005/930, OJ 2006 L 379/123; and
Council Common Position 2006/380/CFSP of 29 May 2006 updating Common Position 2001/
931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing Common
Position 2006/231/CFSP, OJ 2006 L 144/25. The fact that the lists have not been renewed is all
the more serious given the change in composition of Council following the accession of
Bulgaria and Romania.
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the detrimental effects that such decisions have on individuals and
organisations are truly kept to the minimum necessary for the protection
of the public interest.
5.5 The right of effective judicial protection and
the domestic terrorist list
It is now time to consider the problems arising from the EU domestic
terrorist list. In relation to those individuals and organisations who have
no link with a third country, no freezing Regulation could be adopted
since there is no passarelle clause between the third and the first pillar.
Thus, and as said at the beginning, the EU domestic terrorist list is little
more than a naming and shaming exercise: individuals and organisations
are put on the list, their assets are not frozen since there is no competence
to do so at EU level, and the only obligation falling upon Member States is
to ‘fully exploit’, upon request, their existing powers in accordance with
EU law and international conventions.36 Thus, the inclusion in the EU list
does not impose upon the Member States an obligation to outlaw the
organisations therein listed; or for those Member States which have
proscription lists at domestic level, an obligation to transpose the EU list
in their own domestic instrument;37 and there is no duty to freeze the
assets of those individuals and organisations which are identified in the
Common Position. Given the fact that Member States are under no duty
to take specific action against those listed in the Common Position, one
could well wonder why such listing was deemed necessary at European
level. Similar cause for perplexity is provoked by the decision to adopt
such a list using a Common Position, the only Title VI instrument which
is entirely excluded from the, already limited, jurisdiction of the ECJ.38
After all, Common Positions are policy instruments which, according
36 Article 4 Common Position 2001/931/CFSP.
37 Cf. in the UK, the Anti-Terrorism Act 2006, and 2000, and the list of the proscribed groups,
available at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/terrorism-act/
proscribed-groups. Several of the groups which are listed in Common Position 2001/931
as amended, are not listed in the UK list.
38 I have argued elsewhere that Common Position 2001/931 is, at least so far as concerns home
terrorists, a decision and as such it is subject to the (voluntary) jurisdiction of the ECJ, see
Spaventa ‘Fundamental what?’, cited; see also Advocate General Mengozzi’s opinion in Case
C-355/04 P Segi et al v. Council, delivered 26 October 2006, case still pending at the time of
writing.
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to Article 34(2)(a) TEU should define ‘the approach of the Union to
a particular matter’. Furthermore, the European Parliament has no role
to play in the adoption of Common Positions, unlike for decisions and
framework decisions where it has a right to be consulted. Given that the
choice of a policy instrument to identify individuals and organisations
seems rather ill-fitted with the aim pursued by the measure, one could well
wonder whether such choice was not driven by the desire to limit
democratic and judicial scrutiny.
Since there is no jurisdiction of the European courts, the only avenue
open to applicants wishing to be delisted is that of pursuing their case in
front of the national courts. However, action in front of national courts
might well not be particularly effective not the least since, even should the
national court make a finding favourable to the person/entity listed, that
finding would not have effects beyond the domestic jurisdiction. We are
first going to analyse the obstacles to effective judicial protection, to then
turn to the assessment of the powers and duties of the national courts
under EU law.
The first hurdle that the applicant needs to overcome is that of estab-
lishing standing in front of a national court: in most jurisdictions standing
is conditional upon there being a challengeable act to attack. In relation
to the EU list, however, that might not be the case since the ‘naming and
shaming’ is self-executing, i.e. it does not necessarily need implementation
at national level. Its purpose is achieved by virtue of its very existence.
And, as we have seen in the previous sections, the fact that inclusion in the
list should follow a decision taken by a ‘competent authority’ is not in
itself guarantee of it being a challengeable decision. First, it seems that the
competent authority might be external to the EU. Second, the applicant
might well be in the dark as to which authority, and which Member State,
has taken the decision concerning him/it. As we have seen in the OMPI
case, one of the reasons which led the CFI to quash the inclusion of the
applicant in the list was the fact that neither the Council nor the United
Kingdom could, or wanted to, disclose the identity of the ‘competent
authority’ which had initially taken the decision which determined the
OMPI’s inclusion in the list. Third, even when the authority is known to
the applicant, the information upon which inclusion in the list is based
might not have been disclosed. In this respect, it should be considered
whether the OMPI ruling imposes substantive duties of disclosure upon
national authorities and/or Council.
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Here we should distinguish the case in which the applicant challenges
the original decision taken before its inclusion in the EU list39 from the
case in which the applicant challenges such decision after having been
included in such list. The distinction is important since in the former
situation the matter is wholly regulated by national law and European law
cannot be of assistance. In the latter case, however, the issue clearly falls
within the scope of European law and, for this reason, some procedural
guarantees should apply as a matter of EU law. In this respect it is worth
recalling the ruling in Ayadi.40 That case concerned the inclusion of the
applicant in the list annexed to the Anti-Taliban Regulation, i.e. the
Regulation adopted in order to give effect to the UN Anti-Taliban
Resolution. As said above, individuals and organisations whose assets
are to be frozen are identified by the UN Sanctions Committee, and the
UN list is then transposed in a Union and Community instrument.
Competence to strike people off the list rests with the UN Sanctions
Committee and the delisting procedure can be triggered only by a State
which makes representations on behalf of the applicant. In Ayadi, the CFI
clarified that Member States have substantive obligations in relation to the
delisting process (such as the duty to consider the applicant’s case; the
duty to allow for judicial review of the decision not to make representations
at UN level, etc.) and that such obligations are binding upon national
authorities by virtue of Community law, following the established principles
according to which, whenMember States have a discretion in implementing
Community law, they have a duty to comply with fundamental rights as
general principles.
The reasoning in Ayadi can be transposed to the EU list, even lacking
the Community courts’ jurisdiction. Thus, the national authority which
has taken the initial decision should be under the same obligation as those
outlined by the CFI in relation to Council in the OMPI ruling. Once the
organisation/individual has been put on the EU list, the matter falls within
the scope of EU law and for this reason the procedural and fundamental
rights guarantees imposed by EU law must apply to proceedings at
national level also in respect to the national competent authority. As a
result, it can be argued that, as a matter of EU law, such an authority has
a duty to state the reasons which led it to take the decision (subject to the
39 See to this effect the obiter dictum in Case T-228/02, para. 119.
40 Case T-253/02 Ayadi v. Council, judgment of 12 July 2006, nyr.
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public security caveat) and that fundamental rights as general principles of
EU law apply in full. Finally, and as mentioned above, the OMPI ruling
applies also to the Common Position. Whilst the Community courts lack
jurisdiction to enforce such obligations, Council should consider itself
bound by it and therefore individuals and organisations listed in the
Common Position should have a (non-enforceable) right to a statement of
reasons from Council as well as a right to be heard.
Leaving aside the practical difficulties that might arise in accessing a
national court, there are serious problems as to the extent to which the
national court could extend its review beyond the decision of the national
authority. In this respect, one should consider Advocate General Mengozzi’s
opinion in the case of SEGI. SEGI is an alleged terrorist organisation
fighting for Basque independence which was included in the list attaching
to Common Position 2001/931. SEGI first brought its case in front of the
ECtHR, which refused jurisdiction on the grounds that the issue was one of
potential, rather than actual, violation of fundamental rights.41 It then
brought proceedings for damages in front of the CFI which dismissed the
action for manifest lack of jurisdiction. In an obiter dictum, the CFI
acknowledged that probably no judicial remedy would be available to the
applicant in relation to its inclusion in the EU list.42 In his opinion in the
appeal to the CFI ruling, Advocate General Mengozzi focused on the latter
obiter to express his views on the duties of national courts in relation to
third-pillar instruments especially, if not only, when the European courts
lack jurisdiction. In particular, he was concerned with the non-availability
of an action for damages in relation to EU law. Relying on the fact that the
EU is, by express provision of the TEU, bound by fundamental rights and
the rule of law, the Advocate General argued that the fact that the European
courts lacked jurisdiction did not imply that there was no judicial remedy
available. Rather, by relying on the duty of loyal cooperation which applies
also to the third pillar,43 Mr Mengozzi found that ‘in the context of the
third pillar of the Union as well it is for the Member States to establish a
system of legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the right
to effective judicial protection and for their courts to interpret and apply
41 Decision declaring the inadmissibility of the case Segi and Gestoras pro-Amnistia v. 15 States of
the European Union, appl. No. 6422/02 and 9916/02, 23 May 2002.
42 Case T-388/02 Segi et al v.Council, order of 07/06/04, appeal pending (Case C-355/04 P), para. 38.
43 Case C-105/03 Pupino (2005) ECR I-5285.
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the national procedural rules governing the bringing of actions in such a
way as to ensure such protection’.44 Furthermore, the Advocate General
argued that national courts should consider themselves competent to
declare a third pillar instrument invalid, even when they are able to refer the
matter to the ECJ. Thus, the principle established by the CFI in Foto-Frost
should not apply to the third pillar since in the latter, unlike in the
Community pillar, there is no complete system of legal remedies and there
is no system to ensure the uniform application of EU law. As a result, in the
Advocate General’s opinion, not only do individuals have a right to seek
annulment of a Common Position which concerns them, but also have a
right to damages which must be considered as inherent in the TEU. And in
relation to those matters the standard of fundamental rights protection to
be applied is (or should be) that of EU law, rather than that of national
constitutional law.
The arguments put forward by Advocate General Mengozzi are com-
pelling and it is to be seen whether the ECJ will be willing to espouse them
in a ruling which would arguably go beyond its jurisdiction. Even were
that the case, it is clear that given the institutional structure of the third
pillar, the only means of guaranteeing effective judicial protection are in
the hands of national courts. And, as argued by Mr Mengozzi, the need to
ensure such a protection in relation to EU instruments should be seen as
an obligation placed upon national courts directly by the EU system.
As well as the arguments outlined above, there are other considerations
which could lead the national courts to take as active role as possible in
relation to these matters.
First, one could argue that the Council Common Position is ultra vires
since its adoption conflicts with Article 6 TEU which is a provision
binding on the EU institutions regardless of whether the European courts
have jurisdiction in assessing the breach. Thus, it could be argued that the
very adoption of an act at EU level which has detrimental effects on
individuals, and which does not provide for an effective system of judicial
protection that includes the possibility of challenging the evidence upon
which the inclusion in the list has been decided, constitutes a breach of the
right to effective judicial protection guaranteed by the Treaty. In such a
case, and in the absence of jurisdiction of the European courts, it would
fall upon national judiciaries to declare such Act legally void (in its
44 Opinion in Case C-355/04, para. 107.
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entirety and not only in relation to the person who has brought the
challenge). And, in this respect, the ruling of the CFI was a lost oppor-
tunity since, had it put fundamental rights before political considerations,
it should have declared the entire Regulation unlawful, possibly leaving
the Member States a reasonable time to enact national rules freezing the
assets of those on the list to avoid the danger of a general defreezing order.
The same reasoning could also be made at national level, by relying on
national constitutional law rather than EU law. In this respect, the doc-
trines of limited conferral of power espoused by the German and Italian
Constitutional courts in the 1970s should be revived in relation to third
pillar instruments.45 As long as the EU does not guarantee fundamental
rights protection to a level comparable to that guaranteed in national law,
the national constitutional courts should retain the last word as to the
compatibility of EU instruments (not only third pillar instruments but
even second pillar) with their constitutional guarantees. And, similarly,
this line of reasoning should be followed by the ECtHR which should clearly
state that the (rebuttable) presumption of equivalent protection between
the Community and Convention system does not apply in relation to acts
of the European Union.46
Second, the national courts could rely on the Yusuf ruling in relation to
Common Position 2001/931, so as to justify the scrutiny of the com-
patibility of the Common Position with fundamental rights as general
principles of EU law. In Yusuf, the CFI held that it could not assess the
validity of the Regulation at stake, since it was implementing a Security
Council Resolution. Since the Council had no discretion as to whether to
include Mr Yusuf in the list, then the CFI could not assess the compati-
bility of the Regulation with the general principles of Community law, as
that would have implied the review of the UN Council Resolution with
Community law, something that the CFI felt was not possible. However,
the CFI also held that it was in its power to assess the compatibility of the
45 See German Constitutional Court rulings in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft CMLRep. (1974),
p. 540 (Solange I); Steinike und Weinlig CMLRep. (1980) p. 531; Brunner and others v. EU Treaty
31 CMLRev. (1994), p. 57; and the Italian Constitutional Court rulings Sentenza 7/3/64, n. 14
(in F. Sorrentino, Profili Costituzionali dell’Integrazione Comunitaria (Torino: Giappichelli
Editore, 1996, 2nd ed.), pp. 61 et seq. and Societa´ Acciaierie San Michele v. High Authority
(judgment of 27 December 1965, n. 98), CMLRep. (1967), p. 160.
46 See Case Bosphorus etc v. Ireland (Appl. No. 45036/98), judgment of 30/6/05, note J.-P. Jacque´
Revue trimestrielle de droit europe´en (2005), p. 756.
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Regulation with the principles of jus cogens which bind the Security
Council. If such reasoning is transposed to the EU system then, even
should we find that the principle of supremacy applies also in relation to
EU instruments and, therefore, such instruments cannot be assessed
having regard to national constitutional law, it would be open to national
courts to assess the validity of the Common Position in relation to fun-
damental rights as general principles of EU law. Again, since the principle
of effective judicial protection is a principle of EU law, then the national
courts would be entitled (as well as required) by EU law to take a proactive
stance and assess whether inclusion in the list is justified.
This said, the situation is extremely unsatisfactory. The Council’s
response to the OMPI ruling, as well as its delay in renewing the existing
list,47 do not indicate a willingness to react to judicial assessments of the
compatibility of the list with fundamental rights. Furthermore, a ruling at
national level would not have effects beyond the jurisdiction of the court
which issued the judgment and for this reason its effects in relation to EU
instruments would be significantly limited, unless the Council were to be
willing to act promptly to modify the list following a ruling of a national
court to that effect.
5.6 Conclusions
The practice of identifying individuals and organisations as terrorists in
a European instrument is obviously problematic from a fundamental rights
perspective. The exercise of EU competence in this instance has considerably
reduced, if not altogether eliminated, the possibility of a meaningful
democratic debate about how best to address the terrorist threat and how to
strike a reasonable balance between counter-terrorism action and the fun-
damental rights of those concerned. Furthermore, the Council’s decision to
use EU competence in such matters might well raise some questions as to
whether the Member States acted instrumentally to avoid both democratic
and judicial scrutiny. In this respect, consider the oddity of the domestic
terrorist list: individuals and organisations are identified as terrorists in
47 EU officials allegedly said that the non-renewal of the list within the prescribed time is simply a
‘procedural problem’, source EUobserver, 16 January 2007, ‘EU backing down on EU terror list
secrecy’. Mr Piris, Legal Adviser to the Council, allegedly held that the OMPI ruling concerned
the preceding list and not the May list.
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such a list, and yet the Member States are under no obligation to take
action against such individuals/organisations. Given that the UN anti-
terrorism Resolution requires States to act against terrorist organisations
and individuals, one could well argue that the lack of action in respect of
those entities and individuals is in breach of international law. The sus-
picion that inclusion in the EU domestic list might be politically motivated
thus looms large in one’s mind. If it is established that those people and
entities are linked to terrorism, then action should be taken. Or else they
should not be placed on the list. In any event, it is inexcusable that Union
competence should be used so as to deprive individuals of their right to
effective judicial protection.
In relation to the use of Community competence to provide for the
freezing of assets of the foreign-linked ‘terrorist’, the fundamental rights
issue might seem at first sight less pressing. After all, in those cases the
Community judiciary has full jurisdiction. However, and leaving aside
the issues arising from an extensive interpretation of Community com-
petence to the detriment of individual rights, the OMPI ruling is evidence
of the Community courts’ unwillingness to exercise meaningful judicial
scrutiny. Furthermore, Council has so far refused to take any steps to
comply with that ruling; in a national context, such defiance would have
been unthinkable; in the EU, allegedly based on the rule of law, it is all too
possible.
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